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RECENT DECISIONS

Federal Jurisdiction: Interpretation of State Law in Federal
Courts-The plaintiff, Andrew Caporossi, obtained a tort judgment
for $600,000 against the defendant, Atlantic City, New Jersey, on
the grounds of negligence. The action was brought in federal district
court based on diversity. The plaintiff and his bride were spending
their honeymoon at Atlantic City. While swimming there, the plaintiff
dived into the water, struck his head on an abandoned pipe, and
sustained injuries to his spine. The beach at which they were swimming was owned and operated by Atlantic City. The pipe which the
plaintiff struck had been installed by a private hotel, pursuant to a
license issued by the city. That the particular pipe, as well as others,
constituted a hazard to the swimming public was well known to the
operators of the hotel and to at least two of the City Commissioners.
Attorneys for the defendant denied liability, invoking the common
law doctrine of municipal immunity and a state statute which accorded
a similar privilege." The statute provides: "No municipality or county
shall be liable for injury to the person from the use of any public
grounds, buildings, or structures, any law to the contrary notwithstanding. ' 2 The defendant alleged that the site of the injury was a
"public beach," and that as such it fell within the statutory definition
of "public grounds," and that therefore no liability could attach to
any injury sustained thereon. Atlantic City further contended that if
the federal court allowed the plaintiff recovery, such action would
exceed the authority vested in it to determine controversies according
to the laws of the state within which they arise." 3
Title 40, as construed by the highest court of the state of New
Jersey, was found merely to reiterate the common law rule of the
state.: Under such rule, a municipality is immune from liability for
its torts only when they occur during the performance of a governmental rather than a proprietary function. 5 On appeal, Atlantic City
contended that in finding that it was engaged in a propietary function,
the federal court had deviated from the determination of the state
supreme court.
In at least two cited cases the New Jersey Supreme Court has
held that the maintenance of a public park and of a swimming pool
by a city constitutes a "governmental function" within the meaning of
the statute. 6 The federal district court, however, ignored these decisions
140 N.J. R.v.

2 Ibid

STAT. 9-2

(1933).

3Federal Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. (-)

§1652 as interpreted by Erie

R.R. Co. v. Tompldns, 304 U.S. 64, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
4Leeds v. Atlantic City, 13 N.J. Misc. 868, 181 Ati. 892 (Cir. Ct. 1935) ; Falcone
5

v. Newark Board of Education, 17 N.J. Misc. 75, 4 A. 2d 687 (1939).

Board of Chosen Freeholders of Sussex County v. Strader, 18 N.J.L. 108

(1840).
6 Bisbing v. Asbury Park, 80 N.J.L. 416, 78 AtI. 196, 33 L.R.A. (n.s.) 523
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and decided the case in the manner in which they considered the state
supreme court would have, had they been presently confronted with it.
In making its decision the court relied on an apparent trend in the
decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court toward the abolition of
municipal immunity.
This then is the posture of the New Jersey law on this issue.
There are no New Jersey cases which endow municipally owned
public beaches or public parks with proprietary characteristics.
The next logical query involves the legal compulsion of this
court to apply the substantive holding of Kuchler which relies
on Bisbing... .7
The court noted that the doctrine of municipal immunity was out-dated,
and also pointed to a United States Supreme Court decision which
pronounced state holdings not only disharmonious on this point, but
also said that they "disclose the inevitable chaos when courts try to
apply a rule of law that is inherently unsound."8 With the presumption that the New Jersey court would, if faced with the problem,
recognize the inherent unsoundness of the rule as last enunciated in
Kuchler,9 and reverse themselves, the court took that step in their stead.
The Rules of Decision Act'0 provided that: "The laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply." The question of whether
"laws" within the meaning of the Act mean only the statutory law or
the decisional law as well, was long debated. The question was finally
decided in favor of a narrower construction in the case of Swift v.
Tyson." State decisions were found to be merely indicative of the
state of the law, but not laws in themselves. This case was an attempt
to realize the impossible,'12 namely, to standardize decisional law in all
of the states. It was rooted in the jurisprudence of Cicero as interpreted
by Lord Mansfield: "There should not be one law for Rome, another
for Athens, one now, another later, but for all peoples and all times
3
one and the same law should obtain.""1
The rule of Swift v. Tyson was considered by many to be contrary
(E.& A. 1910); Kuchler v. New Jersey & N.Y. R.R. Co., 104 N.J.L. 333,
140 Atl. 329 (E. & A. 1928).
7Caporossi v. Atlantic City, New Jersey, 220 F. Supp. 508, 518, (1963).
8 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
9 See note 6 mupra.
10 See note 3 supra.
"1Swift v. Tyson, 14 U.S. 166 (1842).
12 The Supreme Court said, "There can be no common law of the United States."
Wheaton v. Peters, 12 U.S. 591, 658 (1840).
'3 Luke v. Lyde, 97 L.R. 614, 2 Burr. R. 882, 887 (1759). "Non erit alia lex
Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni
tempore, una eodemque lex obtinebit."
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to the intentions of the drafters of the Rules of Decision Act. 14 It was
denounced vigorously as "unsound, unjust, and illogical,"' 0 and attacked
as unprecedented and unparallelled in the area of conflict of laws,16
but remained unchanged for ninety-six years, adverse criticism notwithstanding.
In Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,17 the rule of Swift v. Tyson was
declared unconstitutional as violative of the "equal protection of the
law" clause. The court said that in attempting to obtain uniformity
throughout the United States the rule prevented uniformity in administration of state law. It has since been argued, however, that
this concept is inconsonant with Article III of the Constitution, which
vests the federal judiciary with the "judicial power of the United
States," which in turn implies the power to make law.'
In the present case, however, the court did not follow the governing state decisional law as last decided by the highest court. It noted,
instead, that the Kuchler 9 case was thirty-five years old, and that its
antiquity was tantamount to obsolescence. It pointed out that in more
recent cases the intermediate court of appeals in New Jersey had
20
departed from the Kuchler interpretation of proprietary functions,
and that such departure was indicative of a trend in New Jersey law.
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America" it was strongly
argued by Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion that the strict
rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 22 should be relaxed, and that a federal
court should be able to reach a conclusion contrary to 'an outmoded
state supreme court decision. He argued that the federal court should
attempt to decide what the state court would do with a question at
the present time, rather than what they had done with it in the distant
past. His argument was espoused in the Caporossi case. Stare decisis,
the court said, is not an immutable criterion, but rather should serve
as a flexible marker for guidance and allow of re-analysis and redetermination of the issues involved.
The Caporossi decision, upon close analysis, is disturbing. If upheld,
it would seem to give the federal courts a latitude of discretion never
intended by the United States Supreme Court nor by the courts of
See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HARv.L. REV. 49 (1923).
2540 L.R.A. (n.s.) 380 (1912).
16 71 A.L.R. 1102 (1931).
17 See note 3 supra.
'2

18 E.g., Coox, THE LOGICAL

AND

LEGAL BASES

OF THE CONFLICr OF LAWS

143

(1942).
19 See note 6 supra.
20 Kelley v. Curtiss, 29 N.J. Super. 291, 297, 102 A. 2d 471, 473 (App. Div. 1954);
Stringfield v. City of Hackensack, 68 NJ. Super. 38, 43, 171 A. 2d 361, 364
(App. Div. 1961).
21 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
22See note 3 supra.
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the several states. It seems to be a subtle avoidance of the rule of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 23 which would permit the federal courts, in
any instance absent a very recent state decision, to acknowledge
stare decisis as but a guide post, and then reverse the highest state
courts according to their own determinations. By replacing the discretion of the state court with its own, a federal court can effectively
reverse a state supreme court. This raises several final points of
inquiry. Will federal courts follow their own precedents in the
future? Will they extend Caporossi to avoid Erie R.R. entirely? Will
we return to the chaos of Tyson's rule? Will state high courts be
bound by federal court reversals of the judgments?
MICHAEL

D.

BAUDHUIN

Contracts: Restitution as a Remedy for Breach-Plaintiff,
a professional engineer, entered into an oral agreement to provide
plans and specifications for a proposed motel on land owned by the
defendant. Relying upon defendant's representations and a plot survey
provided by him, the plaintiff submitted preliminary plans for the
proposed building which incorporated land not belonging to the defendant. This land was needed to provide parking facilities required
by the city building code. The defendant's attempts to purchase
additional property and to obtain a building permit were unsuccessful,
and the defendant was unable to secure the necessary financing. As a
result, the project was dropped. Plaintiff submitted a bill for services
performed, and upon defendant's refusal to pay, the plaintiff sued for
services rendered. Barnes v. Lozoff. 1 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
affirmed the lower court allowing plaintiff to recover the reasonable
value of his services. The court held that there was no fault on the
plaintiff's part in preparing the preliminary sketches and that such
sketches were a part of the bargained-for performance, thus bringing the case within section 347 of the Restatement of Contracts.2
The city authority relied on by the court in Barnes suggests that
the decision rests on restitution as a remedy for a breach of contract.3
Restitution in this sense lies as an alternative remedy to a suit on the
contract for damages. The purpose of this remedy is to restore the
injured party to as good a position as was occupied by him prior to
23

Ibid.

1 Barnes v. Lozoff, 20 Wis. 2d 644, 123 N.W. 2d 543 (1963).

§347 (1932) Restitution of Value of a Performance
Rendered By One Party as a Remedy For Total Breach by the Other.
3 Guentrer v. Gragi, 258 Wis. 383, 46 N.W. 2d 194 (1957); Palak v. Kramer,
116 Conn. 688, 166 AtI. 396 (1933) ; Sterling v. Marshall, 54 A. 2d 353 (Wash.
D.C., Mun. Ct. of App. 1947); Parrish v. Taltaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318 P. 2d
642 (1957).

2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS

